Years ago, I discovered a biconditional proposition, a proposition of the form “p if and only if q,” where “p” is replaced with a value judgment and “q” with a statement of fact so that p and q are materially equivalent; that is p and q have the same truth value. In this way, I connected values with facts. The biconditional proposition is this: Values exist if and only if life exists. As philosopher Ayn Rand said, “The concept 'value' presupposes the concept 'life'.” It is only to a living being that anything may be good or evil. Values cannot exist in a vacuum, independent of everything else. Anything that is of value must be of value to someone or some thing. Imagine a universe devoid of life. Nothing could be of value in such a universe. Nothing could be of value to inanimate matter or energy, such as a rock, a drop of water, a molecule of air, or a light beam. Nor could anything be of value to a unit of time or a region of empty space. Only the existence of life makes the existence of values possible. That is, the existence of life is a necessary condition for the existence of values. In other words: If values exist, then life exists. I also read an article written by a biologist who tried to define the term “life,” which is harder to do than you may imagine if you haven't tried. He said that one characteristic that distinguishes living things from nonliving things is this: All organisms exhibit self-generated actions used as means to attain ends. For instance, animals forage for food, and plants send roots down into the soil to obtain water. But an end is just a value. (Something may be of value to an organism even if the organism lacks the intelligence to evaluate it.) This implies that the existence of life is a sufficient condition for the existence of values. In other words: If life exists, then values exist. (In a conditional proposition of the form “if p, then q,” p, the antecedent, represents the sufficient condition, and q, the consequent, represents the necessary condition.) The two conditionals “If values exist, then life exists” and “If life exists, then values exist” can be combined by means of the biconditional equivalence rule to yield: Values exist if and only if life exists. This implies that whatever is pro-life is pro-value (good) and whatever is anti-life is anti-value (bad or evil). That's my starting point for an axiological theory, which I won't develop further here.
That's essentially how I see it. I learned it from Rand. Being an inductionist, she observed that people acted to gain and keep things (i.e., values) and asked why. She was off to the races.
Metaethical realist theories must account for three types of statements: axiological (value-centered), teleological (goal-oriented), and deontological (duty-centered). The reason for the three theories is this: All of a moral agent's acts are motivated by the desire to acquire, retain, or somehow bring about something of positive value or to avoid or dispose of something of negative value (disvalue). A positive value is something that is, or is believed to be, good; a negative value is something that is, or is believed to be, bad or evil. The reason for the axiological theory is to guide such value judgments. Once a value judgment is made, some means to accomplish the desired outcome must be chosen. This accounts for the teleological theory. The deontological theory places constraints on the means that may properly be used to accomplish the desired outcome. Axiological theory tries to bridge the fact/value gap. Deontological theory tries to bridge the related is/ought gap. The two gaps are often conflated. Despite the title of your post, it's about axiological theory, not deontological theory. I'll end by focusing on axiological theory.
I believe the fact/value gap was bridged, as I described in my comment.
Concerning whether there is a gap between factual and teleological statements, I believe the latter are usually treated as evaluative statements. I consider that a failure to distinguish between axiological statements that apply to ends and teleological statements that apply to means. Perhaps that's because some ends also seem to be means. An instrumental value is an end sought not for its own sake but for the sake of some further end, whereas an intrinsic value is a final end sought for its own sake. For instance, having dental work done is of instrumental value, and having healthy teeth is of intrinsic value. The former is a means to the latter. I have a simple teleological theory distinct from the axiological theory that seems to close any gap between factual and teleological statements. The teleological theory is causal in nature and involves necessary and sufficient conditions. Practical experience shows that some means chosen to attain desired ends work and others do not.
I'm not convinced that the is/ought gap has been bridged. The word “ought” has several meanings. For instance, it can express probability—e.g., “According to the weather report, it ought to rain tomorrow”—or advisability—e.g., “You ought to brush your teeth twice daily”. The moral “ought” expresses duty or obligation and, hence, is deontological. There are two kinds of obligations, perfect and imperfect, which correspond to perfect and imperfect rights, respectively. Perfect rights and obligations are those of justice. Imperfect rights and obligations are those of goodness or benevolence. Only perfect rights and obligations can be justly enforced. For instance, suppose there is a perfect obligation to refrain from committing murder and an imperfect obligation to be charitable. Force can justly be used against an aggressor to prevent him from committing murder, but one cannot justly be forced to contribute to a charity. Perfect rights and obligations are most important to libertarianism. I have a theory involving conceptual analysis and logic that attempts to bridge the is/ought gap, but I don't think it quite succeeds.
I reply that the correspondence theory is incomplete. The correct truth theory is a version of alethic pluralism, according to which there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. Here are some examples: Mathematical equations are said to be truth-apt even though they contain symbolic representations of things that don't exist in reality, such as negative and imaginary numbers. In propositional logic, according to the truth table for conditional propositions, a proposition of the form “if p, then q” is false if and only if its antecedent (p) is true and its consequent (q) is false; otherwise, the proposition is true. So, for example, “If 1+1=3, then the Moon is made of cheese” is true even though neither its antecedent nor its consequent is in correspondence with reality. Consider the following counterfactual conditional: “If Joe Biden had died at the age of six, then he would never have been elected the 46th U.S. President.” Everyone I've asked about that statement says it's objectively true, even though neither its antecedent nor its consequent corresponds with reality. Thus, perhaps moral statements can be objectively true in some way besides being in correspondence with reality.
Metaethics is the foundation of ethics. The basic distinction between metaethical theories is between versions of realism and anti-realism. The former have in common the position that some moral statements are objectively truth apt; the latter deny that position and maintain that moral statements are no more than subjective opinions, so there is no fact of the matter, like the issue of whether chocolate ice cream tastes better than vanilla, or vice versa.
All moral statements are said to be normative, as distinct from positive statements said to be factual. Perhaps the most plausible reason for believing moral statements are neither true nor false is this: The most widely accepted theory of truth is the correspondence theory, according to which a proposition is true if and only if it's in correspondence with reality—understood as the external (physical) world, which is in principle observable by the (perhaps aided) senses. Consider these statements: (1) The Earth is an oblate spheroid. (2) It's wrong to torture infants. The positive statement can be confirmed by observing the Earth from the surface of the Moon. One could observe infants being tortured, but one can't see the wrongness of the act in the way one can see the shape of the Earth. Hence, the normative statement doesn't seem to correspond with reality.
I'm not allowed sufficient space to complete my comment. I'll try to continue below.
(Continued from below)
Years ago, I discovered a biconditional proposition, a proposition of the form “p if and only if q,” where “p” is replaced with a value judgment and “q” with a statement of fact so that p and q are materially equivalent; that is p and q have the same truth value. In this way, I connected values with facts. The biconditional proposition is this: Values exist if and only if life exists. As philosopher Ayn Rand said, “The concept 'value' presupposes the concept 'life'.” It is only to a living being that anything may be good or evil. Values cannot exist in a vacuum, independent of everything else. Anything that is of value must be of value to someone or some thing. Imagine a universe devoid of life. Nothing could be of value in such a universe. Nothing could be of value to inanimate matter or energy, such as a rock, a drop of water, a molecule of air, or a light beam. Nor could anything be of value to a unit of time or a region of empty space. Only the existence of life makes the existence of values possible. That is, the existence of life is a necessary condition for the existence of values. In other words: If values exist, then life exists. I also read an article written by a biologist who tried to define the term “life,” which is harder to do than you may imagine if you haven't tried. He said that one characteristic that distinguishes living things from nonliving things is this: All organisms exhibit self-generated actions used as means to attain ends. For instance, animals forage for food, and plants send roots down into the soil to obtain water. But an end is just a value. (Something may be of value to an organism even if the organism lacks the intelligence to evaluate it.) This implies that the existence of life is a sufficient condition for the existence of values. In other words: If life exists, then values exist. (In a conditional proposition of the form “if p, then q,” p, the antecedent, represents the sufficient condition, and q, the consequent, represents the necessary condition.) The two conditionals “If values exist, then life exists” and “If life exists, then values exist” can be combined by means of the biconditional equivalence rule to yield: Values exist if and only if life exists. This implies that whatever is pro-life is pro-value (good) and whatever is anti-life is anti-value (bad or evil). That's my starting point for an axiological theory, which I won't develop further here.
That's essentially how I see it. I learned it from Rand. Being an inductionist, she observed that people acted to gain and keep things (i.e., values) and asked why. She was off to the races.
(Continued from below)
Metaethical realist theories must account for three types of statements: axiological (value-centered), teleological (goal-oriented), and deontological (duty-centered). The reason for the three theories is this: All of a moral agent's acts are motivated by the desire to acquire, retain, or somehow bring about something of positive value or to avoid or dispose of something of negative value (disvalue). A positive value is something that is, or is believed to be, good; a negative value is something that is, or is believed to be, bad or evil. The reason for the axiological theory is to guide such value judgments. Once a value judgment is made, some means to accomplish the desired outcome must be chosen. This accounts for the teleological theory. The deontological theory places constraints on the means that may properly be used to accomplish the desired outcome. Axiological theory tries to bridge the fact/value gap. Deontological theory tries to bridge the related is/ought gap. The two gaps are often conflated. Despite the title of your post, it's about axiological theory, not deontological theory. I'll end by focusing on axiological theory.
But do the gaps exist? Your comment above suggests not.
I believe the fact/value gap was bridged, as I described in my comment.
Concerning whether there is a gap between factual and teleological statements, I believe the latter are usually treated as evaluative statements. I consider that a failure to distinguish between axiological statements that apply to ends and teleological statements that apply to means. Perhaps that's because some ends also seem to be means. An instrumental value is an end sought not for its own sake but for the sake of some further end, whereas an intrinsic value is a final end sought for its own sake. For instance, having dental work done is of instrumental value, and having healthy teeth is of intrinsic value. The former is a means to the latter. I have a simple teleological theory distinct from the axiological theory that seems to close any gap between factual and teleological statements. The teleological theory is causal in nature and involves necessary and sufficient conditions. Practical experience shows that some means chosen to attain desired ends work and others do not.
I'm not convinced that the is/ought gap has been bridged. The word “ought” has several meanings. For instance, it can express probability—e.g., “According to the weather report, it ought to rain tomorrow”—or advisability—e.g., “You ought to brush your teeth twice daily”. The moral “ought” expresses duty or obligation and, hence, is deontological. There are two kinds of obligations, perfect and imperfect, which correspond to perfect and imperfect rights, respectively. Perfect rights and obligations are those of justice. Imperfect rights and obligations are those of goodness or benevolence. Only perfect rights and obligations can be justly enforced. For instance, suppose there is a perfect obligation to refrain from committing murder and an imperfect obligation to be charitable. Force can justly be used against an aggressor to prevent him from committing murder, but one cannot justly be forced to contribute to a charity. Perfect rights and obligations are most important to libertarianism. I have a theory involving conceptual analysis and logic that attempts to bridge the is/ought gap, but I don't think it quite succeeds.
(Continued)
I reply that the correspondence theory is incomplete. The correct truth theory is a version of alethic pluralism, according to which there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. Here are some examples: Mathematical equations are said to be truth-apt even though they contain symbolic representations of things that don't exist in reality, such as negative and imaginary numbers. In propositional logic, according to the truth table for conditional propositions, a proposition of the form “if p, then q” is false if and only if its antecedent (p) is true and its consequent (q) is false; otherwise, the proposition is true. So, for example, “If 1+1=3, then the Moon is made of cheese” is true even though neither its antecedent nor its consequent is in correspondence with reality. Consider the following counterfactual conditional: “If Joe Biden had died at the age of six, then he would never have been elected the 46th U.S. President.” Everyone I've asked about that statement says it's objectively true, even though neither its antecedent nor its consequent corresponds with reality. Thus, perhaps moral statements can be objectively true in some way besides being in correspondence with reality.
To be continued, apparently in reverse order.
Metaethics is the foundation of ethics. The basic distinction between metaethical theories is between versions of realism and anti-realism. The former have in common the position that some moral statements are objectively truth apt; the latter deny that position and maintain that moral statements are no more than subjective opinions, so there is no fact of the matter, like the issue of whether chocolate ice cream tastes better than vanilla, or vice versa.
All moral statements are said to be normative, as distinct from positive statements said to be factual. Perhaps the most plausible reason for believing moral statements are neither true nor false is this: The most widely accepted theory of truth is the correspondence theory, according to which a proposition is true if and only if it's in correspondence with reality—understood as the external (physical) world, which is in principle observable by the (perhaps aided) senses. Consider these statements: (1) The Earth is an oblate spheroid. (2) It's wrong to torture infants. The positive statement can be confirmed by observing the Earth from the surface of the Moon. One could observe infants being tortured, but one can't see the wrongness of the act in the way one can see the shape of the Earth. Hence, the normative statement doesn't seem to correspond with reality.
I'm not allowed sufficient space to complete my comment. I'll try to continue below.
Expecting to see the evil of torturing infants the way you can see the shape of the earth sounds like a Rylian category mistake.